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Abstract. The purpose of this research paper is to analyze the implementation of corporate governance at the Regional
Development Banks, or locally known as Bank Pembangunan Daerah, in Indonesia. The focus of this study is on the role and
the position of the governing body or board as well as the relations between governance in micro context and macro condition in
the framework of institutional theory. The kind of paradigm that is used in this research paper is the post-positivist paradigm by
using mixed methods. To analyze the implementation of corporate governance, this research paper is using several key actors:
BOD’s Size, Board of Commissioners Size, Board of Independent Commissioners Size, Audit Committee’s Size, Block-holder
Ownership, Risk Monitoring Committee, and Nomination and Remuneration Committee. The results of this research paper
indicate that Bank Pembangunan Daerah merely fulfill the requirements of important tools in the implementation of corporate
governance. In the end, this will influence the manageability of risk management and compliance process. This condition has
positioned the importance of the existence of board in the form of both board of commissioners and board of directors in the
management and the achievements of the performance of Bank Pembangunan Daerah (BPDs). In the perspective of corporate
governance theorizing that is related to the institutional approach, board can be the balancing power in the context of the
diversity of agents that display the relationship patterns not only in the micro-level that involve principal, management, and
employees, but also in the macro condition such as legal system in the forms of regulations, social and cultural system, and
political system in the form of relations between companies and both legislative and executive institutions. This is related to the
strong influence of bureaucracy and political institutions that demonstrate the emergence of conflicting objectives and political
interference in the management of Bank Pembangunan Daerah. This condition emerges as the consequences of the existence of
Bank Pembangunan Daerah as regional-owned enterprises (BUMDs) that has dual functions, namely as a business enterprise
that focuses on making profits as well as an agent of regional development and providing services to the public.
Keywords: corporate governance, institutional theory, conflicting objective, political interference, regional development banks
Abstrak. Penelitian ini menganalisis pelaksanaan corporate governance pada Bank Pembangunan Daerah. Kajian
difokuskan pada peran dan kedudukan board serta hubungan antara tata kelola pada konteks mikro dan kondisi makro dalam
kerangka pendekatan institutional theory. Penelitian ini menggunakan paradigma post positivs dengan menggunakan mix
method. Untuk menganalisis pelaksanaan corporate governance, penelitian ini menggunakan proksi: BOD Size, Board of
Commisioner Size, Board of Independent Commisioner Size, Audit Commite Size, Blockholder Ownership, Risk Monitoring
Committee, dan Nomination and Remuneretion Committee. Hasil penelitian menunjukkan bahwa Bank Pembangunan Daerah
baru sebatas memenuhi ketentuan pemenuhan organ-organ penting dalam pelaksanaan corporate governance. Hal ini pada
akhirnya mempengaruhi pengelolaan manajemen risiko (risk management) dan compliance process. Kondisi ini memposisikan
pentingnya keberadaan board dalam wujud dewan komisaris maupun direksi dalam pengelolaan dan pencapaian kinerja Bank
Pembangunan Daerah (BPD). Dalam perspektif teorisasi corporate governance yang terkait dengan pendekatan institusional,
board dapat menjadi kekuatan penyeimbang dalam konteks keberagaman aktor (agent) yang menunjukkan pola hubungan
tidak saja dalam tataran mikro yang melibatkan pemilik (principal), management, dan pekerja, tetapi juga kondisi makro
seperti sistem hukum dalam bentuk regulasi, sistem sosial dan budaya, dan sistem politik dalam bentuk hubungan antara
perusahaan dengan lembaga legislatif dan eksekutif. Hal ini berkaitan dengan kuatnya pengaruh birokrat dan institusi politik
yang menunjukkan munculnya conflicting objective dan political interference dalam pengelolaan Bank Pembangunan Daerah.
Kondisi ini muncul sebagai konsekuensi dari keberadaan Bank Pembangunan Daerah sebagai Badan Usaha Milik Daerah
(BUMD) yang memiliki fungsi ganda yaitu sebagai entitas bisnis yang berorientasi pada pencapaian keuntungan dan juga
sebagai agent of regional development dan melayani kepentingan masyarakat.
Kata kunci: corporate governance, institutional theory, conflicting objective, political interference, bank pembangunan daerah

INTRODUCTION
In the practical level, the complexity of banking
business has made it important for banks to put forward
the principles of risk management that is based on the
implementation of Good Corporate Governance (GCG).

In addition to the linkage with the complexity and the
characteristics of the banking industry that is different
from other sectors, the implementation of GCG in the
banking sector is also based on the needs to increase the
public trust especially in relation to the function of banks
as intermediate institutions that collect funds from the
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society and redistribute these funds in the form of loans. In
addition, the improvement of public trust is the foundation
of the improvement of added value for shareholders and
guaranteeing the achievement of good banking. This
is, naturally, very relevant because the continuity of the
operational business of a bank is relying on the public trust,
which eventually will be reflected on the improvement of
both the performance of the management of the bank that
is based on the principles of prudential bank as well as the
capability of the bank to manage risks.
De Andres and Vallelado (2008, p.2570) stated that
the business complexity of the banking influences the
increasing asymmetry information. This, in the end,
will reduce the capability of stakeholders in conducting
supervisions to the decisions of the leadership of the bank.
This condition has led to a need for strict regulations
in the banking industry as it is related to the tasks and
the responsibility of banks in maintaining the security
of public savings, protecting the stability of payment
system, and reducing the occurrence of systematic
risks (De Andres and Vallelado, 2008, p.2570). In the
view of Fama (1980) and Fama and Jensen (1983),
the mechanism of supervision that comes from outside
of the company (the market, in this case) serves as a
mechanism to ensure that the management will act in
accordance with existing regulations and procedures in
order to achieve the goals of the company.
Corporate governance is a system that is linked to
the corporate settings (Blair, 1995, p.3). This is related
to the mechanism of power-sharing and regulations
toward management activities in achieving the goals of
the company. In essence, these goals are related to the
process of achieving added value to serve the interests
of all stakeholders (Monks and Minow, 2004, p.2). In
relation to creating added value, especially for investors,
Shleifer and Vishny (1997, p.737) stated that corporate
governance is related to the method or the mechanism
to convince shareholders in achieving the return of
investment that correspond to the money invested in the
company. Both of these views put corporate governance in
the context of understanding toward values, preferences,
responsibility, and orientation toward stakeholders for
every decision and policy that is taken in the process of
improving the achievements of the goals of the company
in the future. In line with the opinions of Monks and
Minow (2004), and Shleifer and Vishny (1997), Turnbull
(1997, p.181) put the emphasize of the governance
within an organization that put the focus on the aspects
of control and regulations by paying an attention to the
factors that influence the organizational process in order
to produce and sell goods and services. In addition to
that, the importance substance in establishing corporate
governance lies in the aspect of controllers and regulators.
Turnbull (1997) placed governance in the context of how
an organization can run smoothly in accordance with the
purpose that has been determined.
Meanwhile, Lukviarman (2004, p.152) emphasized
the aspect of checks and balances in the implementation
of corporate governance. Lukviarman (2004, p.141)
defined corporate governance as a system that consists of
various kinds of device or institutions as well as both the
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code of conducts and the law that are required to maintain
the checks and balances so that the system can work in
an optimal fashion. In this case, Lukviarman (2004,
p.141) placed corporate governance as a mechanism that
regulate doing the right things right with emphasizing on
the meaning of the right things. In the end, from various
definitions as mentioned above, it can be concluded that
corporate governance is a form of relations and process
that implemented by a company to create added value to
the shareholders in a long term and sustainable way while
still paying attention to the interests of the stakeholders
based on existing regulations.
Doowo Nam (2007, p.286) positions corporate
governance as the structure, process, or mechanism that
represent the interests of all of the stakeholders (majority
shareholders, minority shareholders, managers,
employee, labor unions, and others) and focuses on board
of directors (BOD). In a larger context, this in the end
will be related to the strategy, HR policy, organizational
management, finances, and decision-making process
that involve all of the stakeholders (Doowo Nam,
2007, p.286). Doowo Nam (2007, p.287-289) places
the importance of strengthening board of directors,
outside directors, strengthening the committees under
the coordination of board of directors (committees of the
BOD), and Audit Committee.
The above opinions, in essence, positioned the
importance of the board’s presence including those
committees under the board’s control in the company
management. Busta (2008, p.68) identify the board’s
presence in the form of board size, the proportion of
independent directors, the number of committees, and
the frequency of board meetings. In the context of the
company’s operations, the frequency of board meeting
is an important dimension for the accomplishment of
board’s operations or activities (Vafeas, 1999, p.113),
mainly can be used to conduct evaluation toward the
implementation of the company’s operation activities
(Vafeas, 1999, p.140). In relation with the importance of
the presence of the committees under the board control,
Turlea, Mocanu, and Radu (2010, P.395) put an emphasis
on the importance of audit function as part of governance
mechanism, which consist of internal audit function,
audit committee and external audit. Meanwhile, Tao
and Hutchinson (2013), revealed the importance of the
role of risk management and compensation committee
in reducing the occurrence of asymmetric information,
which in the end may reduce risk.
In the context of Indonesia as a country that embraced
two-tier system, this research paper emphasizes the
importance of the board of directors, the board of
commissioner, as well as the committees under the
coordination of the board of commissioners (the audit
committee, the remuneration and nomination committee,
and the risk control committee) as the device of the
organization that carries decision-making and decisioncontrol functions. This device of the organization is later
composed in a corporate body that consists of: 1) The
Annual General Meeting of the Shareholders, 2) the
Board of Commissioners (supervisory board), and 3) the
Board of Directors. – (see Figure 1).
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Figure 1. The Structure of Two-Tier Board in Indonesia
Sources: Law No. 40/2007 on Limited Companies
This research paper analyzes the implementation of
corporate governance in the regional development banks
in Indonesia, locally known as Bank Pembangunan
Daerah (BPD), mainly in relation to the role and
the position of the Board of Commissioners as the
supervisory board and the Board of Directors as the
board of management. This is important because the
existence of both the supervisory board and the board of
management can be used as a driving force in order to
ensure the governance system can run well.
The newness of this research paper lies on two things.
First, in the context of the development of the study of
corporate governance, this research paper positions the
importance of the role of the boards (both the board of
commissioners and the board of directors) to strengthen
the internal condition of a company. Both the selection
and the determination of the composition of the boards
have an important meaning because they are related to
the management of the company, which in the end will
influence the performance of the company. Second, the
research paper also examined corporate governance
by using the approach of institutional theory. This is a
consequence of the form of BPDs as a regional-owned
enterprise. This research paper discovers that the variety
of actors within the governance structure of BPDs is
not only limited to the micro level that involve owners,
employees, and managers, but also to the macro level
that is related to the system of law and regulations, social
and cultural system, as well as political system.
The institutional approach is used to analyze the
interconnectedness between the governance that is
established in the micro context (the governance in
BPDs) and the macro condition (Prasetyantoko, 2008,
p.50). Prasetyantoko (2008, p.50) said that the nuance of
institutional approach is more leaning toward the study
of political economy than the micro study of corporate
governance in relation to the classical theorization
of company. This means that there is an obvious
interconnectedness between the macro-institutional
system and the behavior in the micro sector (company).
In relation to corporate governance, then this approach
is mentioned as the politico-institutional approach
that is developed by Mark J. Roe and Masahiko Aoki
(in Prasetyantoko, 2008, p.51). Roe (2003) stated that
both the success and the failure of a company are also
determined by the political and social environment
factors that surround the company. In this case, Roe
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(2003) argued that the political factor is often invisible
and almost never analyzed, but it is actually very
influential toward the shape, the structure, and the
governance of a company. Prasetyantoko (2008, p.51)
stated that a corporation is no other than an economic and
law agent so that the economic and law factors within the
corporation contains the political elements that cannot
be overlooked in the analysis of corporate governance.
Meanwhile, Aoki (2001, p.281) stated that corporate
governance is a mechanism that control the strategic
interactions among actors within the organizational
field of a company. In this case, Aoki (2001, p.281) said
that corporate governance mechanism is a set of selfenforceable rules (formal or informal) that regulates the
contingent action choices of the stakeholders (investors,
workers, and managers) in the corporate organization
domain. Aoki (2001, p.281) positions 3 (three) main
components in the organizational field of a company,
namely investors, employees, and managers.
The interaction pattern in the organizational field of
a company consists of several basic elements such as
ownership rights, control system, supervision, payroll,
information, and social relations (Prasetyantoko, 2008,
p.53). In the end, corporate governance cannot be
separated from the supporting network on a macro level
such as law, social, and political systems. Corporate
governance occurs on both internal networks (micro level)
and external networks (macro level) – (Prasetyantoko,
2008, p.53). Furthermore, Prasetyantoko (2008, p.53)
said that in the context of game theory, the relationship
patterns in the micro-level networks will generate the
same characteristic, but if the complimentary macro
factor is also added, then the relationship patterns
become unique and depending on the macro context or
socio-political context.
Aoki (2001, p.14-15) revealed that in the study of
corporate governance, the rules of the game are not
only endogenous (only one field), but also exogenous,
which involve various fields that in the end will form an
equilibrium. Aoki (2001, p.22-25) divided these fields
into 6 (six) forms, namely: (1) common domain, (2)
trade/economic domain, (3) organization domain, (4)
organizational field , (5) political or political economics
domain, and (6) social exchange domain. In this context,
Prasetyantoko (2008, p.52) said that managers play a
central role in managing these complex relations. This
central role is related to two respects. First, managers should
acknowledge that there are many actors that are involved
within the company, so that the equilibrium will not only
occur on merely one point but also on various equilibrium
points (multiple equilibrium). Second, the external actor
determines the form of the equilibrium within the internal
environment of the company, so therefore different social,
political, and law systems will also generate different
patterns of equilibrium (typical equilibrium).
RESEARCH METHODS
This research method used post-positivist paradigm with
mixed methods designs. The selection of both quantitative
and qualitative research methods is emphasized on the
process of data collection and research data analysis.
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The quantitative data in the form of numbers that is
obtained from the 2007-2013 financial report of Bank
Pembangunan Daerah, the 2007-2013 annual report
of Bank Pembangunan Daerah, the 2007-2013 GCG
performance report of Bank Pembangunan Daerah,
and the Indonesian banking statistics in the 2007-2013.
Meanwhile, the qualitative data is obtained through
document studies on the implementation of GCG on
Bank Pembangunan Daerah and interviews that are
conducted with several informants that include: (1)
Chief Commissioners (BPD East Java, BPD Central
Java, Bank DKI), (2) Directors (Bank DKI Managing
Director, BPD South Kalimantan Managing Director,
Bank DKI Chief Compliance Officer/CCO), (3)
Bank Pembangunan Daerah Association Executive
Director, (4) Banking practitioners, (5) Financial
Services Authority (OJK) Banking Supervision
Deputy Commissioner IV, and (6) BUMD Chief of
the Regional Financial Directorate at the Ministry of
Home Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia.
This research paper selected Bank Pembangunan
Daerah as the research object because BPDs belongs
to the banking industry with unique characteristic
in comparison to other commercial banks. As a
commercial bank, Bank Pembangunan Daerah has
the characteristic of high regulated industry (Berger
and Humprey, 1992; De Andres and Vallelado, 2008;
Turlea, Mocanu, and Radu, 2010), opaque industry
that is marked with the presence of asymmetric
information (De Andres and Vallelado, 2008; Turlea,
Mocanu, and Radu, 2010), and high leveraged industry
(De Andres and Vallelado (2008, p.2570). However,
Bank Pembangunan Daerah is a regional-owned
enterprise (BUMD) that has dual function as a business
enterprise with the commercial goal of increasing the
local revenue as well as a provider of public services
that focuses on increasing the local economic and
development growth in order to improve the standard
of living of the community. This dual function is
identified as conflicting objectives in the governance
of BPDs, which in the end will influence the capability
of BPD to compete with private commercial banks.
Both the population and the sample of this research
paper consist of the whole Bank Pembangunan Daerah
in Indonesia as many as 26 BPDs. However, during
the research, there are three BPDs with incomplete
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data, and therefore disqualified as samples, namely
(1) BPD Lampung, (2) BPD Bengkulu, and (3) BPD
Central Sulawesi. In this research paper, the proxies
that are used to measure corporate governance are: (1)
BoD_Size (members of board of directors ∑BPDi), (2)
BoC_Size (members of commissioners ∑BPDi), (3)
BoC_Indp (∑ independent members of commissioners
BPDi divided by ∑ members of commissioners BPDi),
(4) Audit_Size (∑ members of audit committee BPDi),
(5) Block_Own (The percentage the number of shares
owned by block holder), (6) BoC_Meeting (∑ the
meeting of the board of commissioners BPDi in a
year), (7) RMC_Size (∑ members of the risk observer
committee BPDi), (8) NRC_Size (∑ members of the
remuneration and nomination committee BPDi) Busta (2008), Turlea, Mocanu, and Radu (2010), Tao
and Hutchinson (2013), and Vafeas (1999)
In the analysis data, this research used the concurrent
triangulation design. The use of the strategy is based
on the assumption that the researcher collects both
quantitative and qualitative data concurrently, and then
compare the two database to find out whether there
are convergence, differences, or several combinations
(Creswell, 2009, p.213). That is, in this research paper,
the author will present statistics results (quantitative
data) first, and then followed by the analysis on
qualitative data to support or reject the results. The
quantitative data analysis is used by utilizing both
univariate analysis. Univariate analysis is conducted by
using the measure of central tendency and the measure
of dispersion in the form of mean, median, modus,
and deviation standard. The qualitative analysis data is
conducted by utilizing three stages, which are: (1) data
reduction, (2) data presentation, and (3) conclusion or
verification (Miles and Huberman, 1984).
RESULT AND DISCUSSION
The data in this research paper is obtained from
the BPD annual report and the Indonesian banking
directory for 2007-2013 period. The following is
the descriptive statistics of corporate governance on
BPD for 2007-2013 period (see Umanto, Wijaya, and
Atmoko, 2015, p.85):
The data on Table 1 as shown above indicated that
average number for the members of the Board of

Table 1. Descriptive Statistics for Corporate Governance
BOC Audit Size RMC Size NRC Size
BOC
Ind
Meeting Blockholder
Mean
4.18
3.53
2.36
3.16
3.15
3.39
13.75
.478579
Median
4.00
3.00
2.00
3.00
3.00
3.00
11.00
.449100
Mode
4
3
2
3
3
3
7
.3826a
Std. Deviation
.590
.742
.848
.519
.561
.937
10.260
.1804709
Minimum
2
2
1
2
0
0
2
.1576
Maximum
6
6
4
6
5
6
55
.9994
Sources:Annual Report, GCG Performance Report, and the Indonesian Banking Directory 2007-2013 (compiled)
BOD Size

BOC Size
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Commissioners are around 3.53 or 4 (four) people.
This means that BPD already meets the minimum
requirements for the Board of Commissioners as
stipulated on the Bank Indonesia Regulation (PBI)
No.8/14/PBI/2006 where board members should be at
least 3 (three) people.
The existence of the board of commissioners is very
important because it plays a key role in conducting
supervision toward the actions or decisions that are
made by the directors, as well as advising the directors
in the making and the implementation of banking
strategy (De Andres and Vallelado, 2008, p.2570). Fama
(1980, p.311) and Fama and Jensen (1983, p.332) also
stated that the board of commissioners had an important
function in ratifying and supervising important
decisions that are made by the board of management as
the highest leader of the organization. In addition to the
fact that, in average, the BPDs that become the samples
of this research have already met the requirement of the
total number of commissioners in the board, the BPDs
that are already in operations have also, in average,
fulfilled the requirement as stipulated on PBI No.8/14/
PBI/2006. The BPDs that are already established as
limited companies should follow the Article 1, Number
6 of the Law No. 40/2007 on Limited Companies.
Meanwhile, by the end of 2014, there is still one BPD
that is shaped as Regional Company (PD), namely BPD
East Kalimantan. In this case, BPD East Kalimantan
still followed the provisions under Article 19 of Law
No.5/1962 on Regional Companies. Meanwhile, for
the BPDs that have already been formed as limited
companies should follow Article 1, Number 6 of the
Law No.40/2007 on Limited Company.
For the Independent Board of Commissioners, the
average total number of independent commissioners is
around 2.36 or 2 (two) people. If the members of the
board of commissioners are 4 (four) people, then this
condition already meets the minimum requirements of
the total number of independent commissioners, which
is 50 percent of the total number of board commissioners.
The independent commissioners are positioned as the
members of the Board of Commissioners who do not
have connections in terms of finances, management,
stock ownership, and/or family relations with other
members of board of commissioners, directors and/
or the owners of controlling shares or other relations
that may influence their ability to act independently.
Because of their independent position, the independent
commissioners are expected to be able to conduct a
more effective supervision toward decisions and actions
that are made by directors or management (Hermalin
and Weisbach, 2003, p.10; Adam and Mehran, 2012,
p.248). In the end, this is expected to contribute to the
performance improvement of the company (Saragih,
Nugroho, Umanto, 2012, p.52). In Article 120, Law No.
40/2007 it is stated that independent commissioners are
selected based on the RUPS decisions from the parties
who are not affiliated with the principal shareholder,
directors, and/or other board of commissioners. In
relation to the data above, then it can be said that BPD
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already complied with the regulations on the required
total number of independent commissioners who
become part of board of commissioners. In addition
to the fact that, in average, the BPDs that become
the samples of this research paper already meet the
requirements of the number of the members of board
of commissioners, in average, the BPDs that already
in operations have also met the provisions on PBI
No.8/14/PBI/2006. In addition to requirements of the
existence of independent commissioners, there are
three important committees under the control of the
Board of Commissioners, namely Audit Committee,
Remuneration and Nomination Committee, and
Risk Monitoring Committee. These committees
have the important role and task to assist the Board
of Commissioners in conducting supervision toward
decisions that are made by the Directors.
For the Audit Committee, the total number for the
members are around 3.16 or 3 (three) people with the
composition of one independent commissioner, and 2
(two) other members come from independent parties
with expertise on finances/accounting as well as law
and banking respectively. This committee is lead by the
independent commissioner. The position of the Audit
Committee is very important in conducting supervision
in relation to the application of internal audit function.
Doowo Nam (2007, p.287) stated that the role of an
internal auditor include inspecting the legitimacy of
the top management and directors, investigating the
appropriateness and soudness of financial activities,
examining important accounting standads, evaluating
the performance of external auditors, etc. Meanwhile,
Turlea, Mocanu, and Radu (2010, p.394) placed the
importance of the audit function as part of a governance
mechanism, that consist of the internal audit function, the
audit committee and the external audit. In the perspective
of the application of corporate governance in the
banking industry, the audit committee has the important
role that is mainly connected to the following three: (1)
improving the effeciveness of risk management, control,
and governance process, (2) assisting the management
in identifying and resolving problems that are related to
risk management, and (3) providing an objective view in
relation to the financial reports of the company (Turlea,
Mocanu, and Radu, 2010, p.394-398).
For the Risk Monitoring Committee, the average
number of the members is around 3.15 or 3 (three)
people with the composition of one independent
commissioner while 2 (two) others come from
indepenent parties with skills and expertise on finances
and risk management respectively. This committee
is led by the independent commissioner. The data
indicated that the total members of the Risk Monitoring
Comittee of each bank is varied from 3 (three) to 4
(four) people. The task of this comittee, in essence, is
related to the implementation of supervision toward
the risk management that is carried out by Bank
Pembangunan Daerah. In the theoretical landscape,
Crouhy, Galai, and Mark (2006, p.85) placed the
importance of the risk management committees to
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conduct the risk management on the banking industry.
Crouhy, Galai, and Mark (2006, p.88) encouraged
collaboration between BOD and BOC in realizing the
integration between corporate governance and risk
management as a form of responsibility of the bank
in managing market risk, credit risk, operational risk,
and business risk. In a wider landscape, the integration
between corporate governance and risk management
can be used as leverage for the achievement of
strategic objectives that are stated on the vision and the
mission of the company. In other words, the role of the
Risk Monitoring Committee is important in creating
key policies and procedures that are related to risk
management as well as ensuring that these policies and
procedures can be implemented well (Crouhy, Galai,
and Mark, 2006, p.90). In the end, this is expected
to encourage the realization of risk management
that integrates with the application of corporate
governance and strategy in order to achieve the goals
of the company. Crouhy, Galai, and Mark (2006, p.88)
identified four options of actions that are related to risk
management, which are (1) avoid risk by choosing not
to undertake some activities, (2) transfer risk to third
parties through insurance, hedging, and outsourcing,
(3) mitigate risk, such as operational risk, through
preventive and detective control measures, and (4)
accept risk, recognizing that undertaking certain risky
activities should generate shareholder value.
For the Remuneration and Nomination Committee, the
total number of the members is 3.39 or 3 (three) people
with the composition of one independent commissioner,
a commissioner, and an executive officer in the field
of human resources development. This committee is
led by the independent commisioner. The task of this
committee is basically related to the remuneration policy
of Bank Pembangunan Daerah as well as providing
recommendations about the system of the selection
and the replacement of the members of the Board of
Commissioners and the Board of Directors of BPDs.
For the Board of Directors, the total number of
the members for each BPD is as many as 4.18 or 4
(four) people. This indicates that BPDs already meet
the minimum requirements of the total number of
directors of 3 (three) people. However, it is important
to underline that the fulfillment of the completeness of
the position of directors on BPDs become a problem
that in the end will make the organizational wheel
of the BPDs to not be able to run effectively. When
analyzing the fulfillment of the required total members
for Board of Directors (BOD), then all of the BPDs
already meet the requirement for BOD number. In
general, the number of BODs on BPDs are between
4 (four) people to 5 (five) people. This is, of course,
in line with the scope of business that each BPD runs.
For the Board Meeting Frequency, the average
meeting frequency that is conducted by the Board of
Commissioners is about 13.57 times or 14 in a year
with the mode score of 7 (seven) times. This is, of
course, already meet the regulations as stipulated on PBI
No.8/14/PBI/2006, Article 15, Paragraph 1-3, and Bank
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Indonesia Circular No.9/12/DPNP/2007 that required
and obliged the members of the Board of Commissioners
to present at the meetings of the Board of Commissioners
for at least 4 (four) times in a year. According to Brick
and Chidambran (2010), the meetings of the Board of
Commissioners are one of the forms of the monitoring
task, which later will influence the improvement of
the operational performance of the company. In the
context of the operations of a company, the board
meeting frequency is an important dimension for the
implementation of board operations or board activities
(Vafeas, 1999, p.113). It is especially used to conduct an
evaluation toward the implementation of the operational
activities of a company (Vafeas, 1999, p.140).
In this research paper, block holder is related to the
number of the majority share ownership from all of
the capital that is paid up to the bank. In the period of
2007-2013, the average majority share ownership of
the BPD was at 47.86 percent with the mode score of
38.26 percent. The majority share ownership of BPD
belongs to the respective provincial governments. This
condition generates a quite strong influence from the
provincial governments toward the BPD governance,
which in the end will trigger the possibility of the
emergence of interests that influence the policies of
BPDs. This is shown during the selection process
of both the Board of Commissioners and the Board
of Directors. In certain conditions, the Governors as
Local Leaders tend to force their way to place the
chosen people that will actually become problematic
when these people should follow the fit and proper test
that is conducted by Bank Indonesia or the Financial
Service Authority (OJK). In the end, this condition
hampers the operational activities of BPDs.
Based on the analysis above, it can be said that BPDs
already fulfilled the completion of the elements of
corporate governance in accordance with requirements
from the regulators. However, this research paper
has identified that there are still problems during the
implementation of Good Corporate Governance in
Bank Pembangunan Daerah. First, the weakness in
the fulfilment of governance structure in BPDs as
the consequence of the failure of the candidates for
either directors or commissioners to pass the fit and
proper test that is conducted by Bank Indonesia or the
OJK. The result of this situation is the phenomenon
of vacancies in the Board of Commissioners and the
Board of Directors. Bank Pembangunan Daerah is
forced to conduct operational activities in a position
that is not ideal. This research paper identified that the
problem occurs because the Controlling Shareholder
tend to generalize the operational activities of the bank
with other BUMDs under their control. In fact, the
characteristic of governance in a bank is different when
compared with other BUMDs. The difference is mainly
related to the risk management of a bank that consists
of credit risk, market risk, and operational risk (Crouhy,
Galai, and Mark, 2006, p.14). The incompleteness
of the directors influences the governance of Bank
Pembangunan Daerah, which in the end will impact
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the performance. PT Bank Pembangunan Jawa BaratBanten (BJB), which serves the West Java and Banten
provinces, has experienced a decrease in profitability as
an impact of the incompleteness of its directors (Since
May 12, 2014, Bank BJB only has one director). The
RUPS of Bank BJB on December 19, 2014 selected 7
commissioners that consist of 3 commissioners and 4
independent commissioners as well as 7 directors). The
data from the 2014 annual report of Bank BJB shows
that in 2014, Bank BJB recorded a decrease of 18.6
percent in its net profits when compared with a year
before. The net profits of Bank BJB in 2013 is Rp 1.376
trillion, which experienced a Rp 256 billion decrease to
Rp 1.120 trillion in 2014. This decrease is the impact
of the increasing NPL (non-performing loans) of 1.32
percent. The same condition is also happened Bank
Sumselbabel, which serves South Sumatra and Bangka
Belitung. The shareholders general meeting (RUPS)
in 2013 decided to conduct dividend distribution to
the local government as the shareholder of Rp 104.4
billion. This number is a 20 percent decrease when
compared with a same period in the previous year.
The Bank Sumselbabel Managing Director said that
the degradation of the business performance of the
company happened because of the prolonged vacancies
within the board of directors (www.republika.co.id, 19
Mei 2014). The second problem is the emergence of
politicization in the governance of Bank Pembangunan
Daerah. Local leaders intervene and tend to consider
BPDs as their source of income for the interests of the
group or even personal interests. This research paper
identified that one of the form interventions from the
local leaders as the Controlling Shareholder lies on the
fulfilment of the organizational structure both on Board
of Commissioners and Board of Directors. The selection
of managing directors, directors, or commissioners for
BPDs tends to be based on political desire of the local
leaders. As a result, there is leadership crisis in the BPD
governance as well as the emergence of candidates
for directors who do not meet the requirements in
the fit and proper test that is conducted by Bank
Indonesia. In essence, the implementation of Good
Corporate Governance on BPDs has already attempted
to minimize these interventions through PBI 8/14/
PBI/2006 on the Amendment on the Bank Indonesia
Regulation No. 8/4/PBI/2006 on the Implementation
of Good Corporate Governance on Commercial Banks.
The problem that occurs because of this intervention
is the failure of a number of BPD directors during the
fit and proper test that is conducted by the Financial
Services Authority (OJK). In this case, the directors
who are nominated to attend fit and proper test are the
subordinates of the Controlling Shareholder whose
process of selection and appointment is already played
by the Remuneration and Nomination Committee.
This intervention appears due to the lack of
understanding from the Controlling Share Holders
(represented by Governor/Regent/Mayor) on the
implementation of GCG on BPD. This condition is in
line with the research paper conducted by Arun and
Turner (2009, p.101), which stated the main problem
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of the management of government-owned bank is the
tendency from the bureaucrats to conduct full control on
the bank’s management. On one hand, the bureaucrats
seek to maximize their own interests in relation to
consumptions, leisure, and the addition of staff, but on
the other hand, bureaucrats tend to avoid unnecessary
risk (risk-averse) that they are lack of boldness to take
risk in business management. BPD tend to have limited
autonomy in conducting bank management (Arun and
Turner, 2009, p.102). In the end, Arun and Turner
(2009, p.103) said that the government-owned bank’s
management in developing countries such as Indonesia
is very influenced by political considerations. This
condition, in the end, lead to bureaucrats (politicians)
tend to use government-owned bank to serve their
personal interests (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and
Shleifer, 2002, p.266). In this case, government-owned
banks became instruments for bureaucrats to provide
loans, employment, subsidies, and other benefits for
their supporters to back them again in the form of votes,
political contributions, and bribes. Shleifer and Vishny
(1997, p.768) also stated that bureaucrats have the
ability to control state-owned companies and lead these
firms to pursue every political goals. This condition,
eventually, will create inefficiency in the management
of state corporations (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997,
p.768). This result is also supported by Mark J. Roe
(2003), who stated that political institutions influence
the development of corporate governance’s institutions
(See also Umanto, Wijaya, Atmoko, 2015, p.86).
The patterns of intervention from the officials on
BPDs take the form of nepotism when hiring employees,
asking for loans, as well as requesting funds from
corporate social responsibility programs for political
campaign funds (Majalah Infobank No.407, Vol.
XXXV, February 2013, p.65). In the context of BPDs
as BUMDs, Malang Joedo and Dwijowijoto (2006,
p.61) also identified that the problem in the BUMD
governance lies on the potential of interventions
from the elite in the regions (including local leaders),
local bureaucracy, and Legislative Councils (DPRDs).
According to Malang Joedo and Dwidjowijoto (2006,
p.61-62), the political environment that surrounds
BUMDs will not allow enough space for BUMDs to
develop themselves into companies that are managed
professionally. This condition has left BUMDs to
be prone to inefficiency, unprofessionalism, and
unresponsiveness when following the change and
dynamics of the business and management of the
BUMDs. On the cultural problem, most BUMDs still
tend to apply patriarchalism excessively (Malang
Joedo and Dwidjowijoto, 2006, p.61). In the end,
this will make the decisions to always come from the
superiors and thus the integrity and the credibility of
the BUMDs are considered to be the responsibility of
the superiors. On the leadership problem, the BUMD
management tends to be managed by bossy leaders
(or, in other words, one man show). In this case, the
BUMD leaders are considered to be the controller
of both authority and accountability. This condition
will later trigger the emergence of bureaucratization
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process in the BUMD management, which in the end
will slow down the BUMD business process (Malang
Joedo and Dwidjowijoto, 2006, p.56). In conclusion,
Malang Joedo and Dwidjowijoto (2006, p.62) said
that the form of intervention is related to the selection
of the candidates for the directors, which mostly are
determined by the governmental bureaucracy and thus
the determination process will tend to be more political
instead of professional.
The statements above basically show that BPDs have
merely fulfilled the requirements of the completion
of important tools in the implementation of corporate
governance. This in the end will influence the governance
of risk management and compliance process. The Finance
Director said that (based on an interview conducted on
October 17, 2014): “The GCG implementation. In terms
of the fulfillment of the regulation, this has already been
accomplished. However, if we take a closer look, the GCG
implementation in BPDs is still far below state-owned
banks, other public banks or even private banks”. This
opinion is also supported by a statement from the OJK
Deputy Commissioner IV for Banking Supervision, who
said that (based on an interview conducted on September
22, 2014): “On the governance side, it can be said that
BPDs are not professional yet. There is no standard
SOP (Standard Operating Procedure) to become modern
banks. Owners still consider BPDs are their banks. They
forget that the third party funds or the performance is
still below expectations. In other words, BPDs are still
serving as the cash cow for the Local Governments”.
In order to deepen the analysis, this research paper
conducted a study with the use of the theorization
perspective of corporate governance that is related
with the institutional theory. In the context of BPDs
as BUMDs, this research identified that BPD is an
entity with dual function. First, a BPD is positioned
as a business entity that has the commercial goal to
increase the regional revenue. Second, a BPD serves
as the provider of public service that is focused on
the increasing of economic and regional development
growth in order to increase the standards of living of the
society (see Article 2, Home Affairs Ministerial Decree
No 62/1999 on the Organizational Guidelines and the
Work Procedures of Regional Development Banks).
This dual function is identified as conflicting objectives
in the BPD governance, which in the end will influence
capability of BPDs to compete with private commercial
banks. Wicaksono (2009, p.149) identified conflicting
objectives as one of the problems that is encountered by
state-owned enterprises (BUMN) in the world.
The dual function that is attached to BPDs will in turn
generate the emergence of a governance structure that is
tend to be different when compared to private companies.
In a private company, the governance structure consists
of three elements, namely RUPS (Shareholders’ General
Meeting), Board of Commissioners, and Board of
Directors. Meanwhile, the governance structure of
a BPD as a BUMD consists of two elements, namely
the internal governance structure that consists of
RUPS (Shareholders’ General Meeting), Board of
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Figure 2. The Governance Structure of
Bank Pembangunan Daerah
Sources: Syakhroza (2005), adapted with
the BPD Condition
Commissioners, and Board of Directors, as well as the
external governance structure that consists of: (1) The
Supervising Committee (Board of Commissioners)
and the Management of BPD, (2) Regional Legislative
Councils (Provincial/Regency/City) as the agent that
represent public interests, and (3) Local Governments
(Provincial/Regency/City) as well as (Home Affairs
Ministry, Finance Ministry, and the Financial Services
Authority) as the agent that deal directly with BPDs.
The variety of actors (agents) on regional development
banks indicate that the relationship patterns not only
happen in the micro level that involve owners (Local
Governments in Provinces/Regencies/Municipalities),
employees, and managers (directors and commissioners),
but also in the institutional condition of the company
such as the law system in the form of regulations that
are issued by the government (Finance Ministry, Home
Affairs Ministry, and the Financial Services Authority),
social and cultural system, and political system in the
forms of the relations between the company and the
legislative and executive institutions. In relation to
the political system, in particular, this research paper
support the opinion from Roe (2003), who argued that
the political factor is often invisible and almost never
analyzed, but in fact this factor is very influential toward
the form, structure, and the governance of regional
development banks. This argument was built based on
the results of a study on the ownership structure on many
countries in Southeast Asia such as Thailand, Malaysia,
and Indonesia, which places the strong position of the
majority shareholder (Prasetyantoko, 2008, p.63). The
majority shareholder acts as the controlling shareholder
with control rights that are more than cash flow rights
because of the pyramidal ownership system and the
connection between the ownership structure and the
selection of the board of supervisors (Prasetyantoko,
2008, p.63). In the context of Bank Pembangunan
Daerah, the strong position of the Local Governments
(Provincial/Regency/City) as majority shareholders
are mentioned on the Home Affairs Ministerial
Regulation No. 1/1998, Article 8 (3) that stated that
Local Governments have special voting rights in the
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Shareholders’ General Meetings (see also Umanto,
Wijaya, Atmoko, 2015, p.87).
In relation to the key task and function of BPD as
stated on the Home Affairs Ministerial Regulation No.
62/1999 on the Organizational Guidelines and Work
Procedures of Regional Development Banks, this
research paper identified that BPDs are business entities
that require political supports from bureaucrats (in this
case, the local governments either in the provincial,
regency, or the city level) as well as politicians (in
this case, DPRDs or legislative councils either in
the provincial, regency, or the city level). The local
governments (either provincial, regency, or city) play
the role as shareholders, while DPRDs play the role as
the partners of local governments in legalizing Local
Regulations that are related to Bank Pembangunan
Daerah (such as regulations that are related to the capital
increase of BPD or the change of the form of legal
entity of Bank Pembangunan Daerah). This political
support, in the end, can trigger political interference in
the governance of Bank Pembangunan Daerah (BPD).
This political interference happens especially during
the selection of commissioners and directors. The
Local Governments, represented by Governors as the
majority shareholder put active bureaucrats or former
bureaucrats to be one of the commissioners of Bank
Pembangunan Daerah. In addition, the Governors also
attempt to put their closest people to serve as directors
in Bank Pembangunan Daerah. Other problems occur
when the achievements of both the tasks and the
functions of the BPDs are made to be in accordance
with the vision and the mission of the Governors as
the representatives of the central government and
the society. This means that most of the times there
are differences in the directions of the operational
governance of BPDs as the result of the differences in
the vision and the mission of each Governor that may
be changed during elections every five year.
When this is related to the impact, then the variety
of actors (agents) on one hand is positive because it
will serve as the medium of checks and balances in the
governance BPD so that it can be more optimized in
implementing the tasks and the functions as stipulated
on the Home Affairs Ministerial Regulation No.
62/1999 on the Organizational Guidelines and Work
Procedures of Regional Development Banks. On
the other hand, however, this will cause conflicts of
interests especially among agents who are identified
by Aoki (2001) as polity or political domain in the
form of Local Governments (Provincial/Regency/
City) and DPRDs (Provincial/Regency/City). There
should be a common political consensus to balance
the interests of these two institutions. This is important
because the support from both DPRDs and Local
Governments are very required in the development of
Bank Pembangunan Daerah especially in the context
of capital increase and the governance of BPD that
uphold the principles of corporate governance.
In relation to the results of the study above, this
research paper produce several recommendations.
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First, There is a need to have an improvement on the
understanding as well as conducting socialization
towards Controlling Shareholders and Regional
Councils in order to strengthen the implementation of
governance system on BPD. Both the understanding
and the socialization are expected to reduce the
appearance of conflicting objectives and political
interferences in the management of banking business
that is high regulated, high leveraged, opaque, and
based on the use of intensive knowledge.
Second, the Financial Services Authority (OJK).
encouraging BPD to hold an initial public offering
(IPO). The consideration is based on the idea that IPO
is not only related with the aspect of capital increase,
but also related with the aspect of governance that is
both better and more transparent, the improvement of
the company growth (corporate value), and the public
monitoring which, eventually, will have an impact on
the improvement of the banking management in the
future. In the context of the existing condition on BPD,
this research paper identifies that there are at least three
advantages for BPD that already held an IPO, namely:
(1) The improvement on financial performance.
According to a data from the Indonesian Banking
Statistics on September 2014, it is shown that two
BPDs that already held an IPO (Bank BJB and Bank
Jawa Timur) possess core capital, total assets, total
third party funds, and total lending that are higher if
compared with other BPDs that are yet to hold on IPO,
(2) Clearer in relation with the implementation of GCG,
which eventually will influence the improvement of
intellectual capital. According to a self-assessment data
of GCG BPD, it is revealed that both Bank BJB and
Bank Jawa Timur are on the top three. Because BPDs
already held an IPO, the wheels of their operational
activities will be observed by unlimited parties on the
Controlling Shareholder as shareholders.
Third, for the future research. Diverse actors
(agents) in the governance structure of BPD shows
that the relationship patterns is not only in micro
level that involve owners, workers, board (directors
and commissioners), but also institutional conditions
that is macro level such as legal system in the form
of regulation, social and cultural system, and political
system in the form of relation between company and
legislative and executive institutions. The relation
between these various agents result in the complexity
of the management of Regional Development Bank
(BPD). Aoki (2001) positions this as theoretical
game where agents will interact with each other and
creating institutionalized linkages between the domain
of one organization and the other. In relation to that,
this research paper recommends further researches
to analyze the context of discussion of corporate
governance is focusing on the relation between agents
both on micro and macro level. In relation to that, this
research paper recommends further research to analyze
the context of the discussions on corporate governance
in the framework of game-theoretic perspective that is
developed by Aoki (2001).
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BPD merely complies the provisions of the
fulfillment of important aspects in the implementation
GCG. However, BPD still experience problems in the
fulfillment of governance structure, risk management,
and compliance process. This condition puts an
emphasis on the importance of the presence of board
in the form of board of commissioners and directors in
the management and the performance achievement of
Regional Development Banks (BPDs).
In the theorization perspective of corporate governance
that is related to the institutional approach, board can be
the balancing power in the context of the variety of actors
(agents) that show the relationship patterns not only on
the micro level that involve principals, management, and
employees, but also institutional condition that is on the
macro level such as law system in the form of regulations,
social and cultural system, and political system in the
form of relations between companies and both legislative
and executive institutions. This is related to the strong
influence of bureaucrats and political institutions that
show the emergence of conflicting objectives and political
interference in the management of Bank Pembangunan
Daerah. This condition occurs as a consequence of the
existence of Bank Pembangunan Daerah as regionalowned enterprise (BUMD) that has dual function, which
means it is a business enterprise that focuses on gaining
profits as well as an agent of regional development and
serves the community or public interests.
CONCLUSION
BPD merely complies the provisions of the
fulfillment of important aspects in the implementation
GCG. However, BPD still experience problems in the
fulfillment of governance structure, risk management,
and compliance process. This condition puts an
emphasis on the importance of the presence of board
in the form of board of commissioners and directors in
the management and the performance achievement of
Regional Development Banks (BPDs).
In the theorization perspective of corporate
governance that is related to the institutional approach,
board can be the balancing power in the context of the
variety of actors (agents) that show the relationship
patterns not only on the micro level that involve
principals, management, and employees, but also
institutional condition that is on the macro level such as
law system in the form of regulations, social and cultural
system, and political system in the form of relations
between companies and both legislative and executive
institutions. This is related to the strong influence of
bureaucrats and political institutions that show the
emergence of conflicting objectives and political
interference in the management of Bank Pembangunan
Daerah. This condition occurs as a consequence of the
existence of Bank Pembangunan Daerah as regionalowned enterprise (BUMD) that has dual function, which
means it is a business enterprise that focuses on gaining
profits as well as an agent of regional development and
serves the community or public interests.
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